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ABSTRACT

Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), a standardized lossy
compression scheme for digital audio, which was designed to be
the successor of the MP3 format, generally achieves better sound
quality than MP3 at similar bit rates. While AAC is also the
default or standard audio format for many devices and AAC audio
files may be presented as important digital evidences, the
authentication of the audio files is highly needed but relatively
missing. In this paper, we propose a scheme to expose tampered
AAC audio streams that are encoded at the same encoding bitrate. Specifically, we design a shift-recompression based method
to retrieve the differential features between the re-encoded audio
stream at each shifting and original audio stream, learning
classifier is employed to recognize different patterns of
differential features of the doctored forgery files and original
(untouched) audio files. Experimental results show that our
approach is very promising and effective to detect the forgery of
the same encoding bit-rate on AAC audio streams. Our study also
shows that shift recompression-based differential analysis is very
effective for detection of the MP3 forgery at the same bit rate.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.1 [Multimedia Information Systems]: Audio input/output;
K.6.m [Miscellaneous]: Insurance and Security

General Terms

Algorithms and Security.

Keywords

Forgery detection; audio forensics; AAC; same bitrate.

1. INTRODUCTION

In multimedia forensics, steganalysis and forgery detection are
two interesting areas with broad impact to each other. While
multiple promising and well-designed steganalysis methods have
been proposed and several steganographic systems have been
successfully steg-analyzed [3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15], it seems that
the advance in forgery detection falls behind.
While we enjoy huge volumes of digital multimedia, our
traditional confidence in the integrity via our eyes and ears has
also been undermined since doctored pictures, video clips, and
audio streams are easily manipulated. Generally, tampering
manipulation in digital media involves several basic operations
and the detection of these fundamental manipulations and relevant
forgery has been well studied [1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16]. To our
knowledge, most study of multimedia forgery detection is focused
on digital images.
Some works have been presented to detect the forgery or related
manipulation in audio streams, including MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3,
also known as MP3. For example, if two MP3 audio streams
encoded at different bit-rates are selected in part and composited
together and encoded in MP3 format, such forgery manipulation
undergoes double MP3 compression. While we will be able to
reveal the behavior of double MP3 compression, we may catch
the forged part in MP3 audio streams. However, if two MP3 audio
streams encoded at the same bit-rate and composited together and
encoded in MP3 format with the same bit-rate, the method of
detecting double MP3 compression does not work [15].
Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), a lossy audio compression
scheme, standardized by ISO and IEC, which was designed to be
the successor of the MP3 format, generally obtains better sound
quality than MP3 at similar bit rates. AAC is supported on
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iPhone, iPod, iPad, Nintendo DSi, iTunes, DivX Plus Web Player,
PlayStation 3, PlayStateion Portable, Wii, Sony Walkman MP3,
Sony Ericsson, Nokia, Android, Blackberry, and webOS-based
mobile phones [18]. While AAC audio files widely spread, to our
knowledge, the literature of the forgery detection of AAC audio
files is still missing to this date. Inspired by the method to detect
MP3 forgery by checking offset [16] and the method to detect
misaligned recompression-based forgery in JPEG images [13], in
this paper, we propose a scheme to detect the forgery with the
same bit-rate in AAC audio streams, by designing a shiftrecompression-based differential analysis with learning classifier.
We describe background and relevant work in section 2, and
propose our detection method in section 3. Experiments are
presented in section 4, followed by our conclusion in section 5.

10) Adds additional modules (tools) to increase
compression efficiency: temporal noise shaping (TNS)
[20], Backwards Prediction, Perceptual Noise
Substitution (PNS) [21], etc.
11) Improved Huffman Coding: In AAC, coding by
quadruples of frequency lines applied more often. In
addition, the assignment of Huffman code tables to
coder partitions can be much more flexible.
Figure 1 shows the general processing flow in MPEG-2 AAC
encoding.

2. BACKGROUND AND AAC
TAMPERING
AAC is a standardized, lossy digital audio compression scheme. It
was developed with the cooperation and contributions of
companies mainly including Dolby, Fraunhofer (FhG), AT&T,
Sony and Nokia, and was officially declared an international
standard by the Moving Pictures Experts Group in April of 1997.
AAC was promoted as the successor to MP3 for audio coding at
medium to high bitrates. It follows the same basic coding
paradigm as Layer-3 including high frequency resolution filter
bank, non-uniform quantization, Huffman coding, iteration loop
structure using analysis by-synthesis but improves on Layer-3 in a
lot of details and uses new coding tools for improved quality at
low bit-rates. Its popularity is currently maintained by it being the
default iTunes codec, the media player which powers iPod, the
most popular digital audio player on the market. Furthermore, the
iTunes Music Store, whose sales account for 85% of the market
for legal online downloads, sells AAC-encoded songs
(encapsulated with FairPlay Digital Rights Management)
Compared to MP3, AAC improves the following aspects:
1)

More sample frequencies (from 8 kHz to 96 kHz) than
MP3 (16 kHz to 48 kHz);

2)

Up to 48 channels (MP3 supports up to two channels in
MPEG-1 mode and up to 5.1 channels in MPEG-2
mode);

3)

Arbitrary bit-rates and variable frame length.
Standardized constant bit rate with bit reservoir;

4)

Higher efficiency and simpler filter bank (rather than
MP3’s hybrid coding, AAC utilizes a pure MDCT);

5)

Higher coding efficiency for stationary signals (AAC
uses a block size of 1024 or 960 samples, allowing
more efficient coding than MP3’s 576 sample blocks);

6)

Higher coding accuracy for transient signals (AAC uses
a block size of 128 or 120 samples, allowing more
accurate coding than MP3’s 192 sample blocks);

Regarding AAC audio tampering, generally an original AAC
audio signal is decoded into temporal domain, the doctoring
occurs at the temporal domain by inserting or removing some
voice signals, and the modified audio signal is encoded to AAC
audio format. If the bitrate of inserted audio signal fragment is
different from the bitrate of original AAC audio signal; or the
bitrate used for encoding modified audio signal is different from
the bitrate of original AAC audio signal, the tampering may be
exposed by revealing the different bitrates once used in the
control process. However, if the bitrates are the same, the
detection becomes difficult.

7)

Can use Kaiser-Bessel derived window function to
eliminate spectral leakage at the expense of widening
the main lobe;

Our task targets on the detection of the AAC audio forgery
encoded at the same bitrate used for the original AAC audio
stream.

8)

Much better handling of audio frequencies above 16
kHz;

9)

More flexible joint stereo (different methods can be
used in different frequency ranges);

Figure 1. AAC flowing chart [22]

3. PROPOSED DETECTION METHOD
3.1 Related Study in Image Forgery Detection
Our proposed approach is based on our previous work in detecting
image forgery, therefore, we described the feature extraction for
image forgery detection below [13].
1)
2)

3)
4)
5)

Decode an JPEG image under examination to spatial
domain, which is denoted by matrix S(i,j) (i=1, 2, …, M; j
= 1, 2 …, N);
Shift the matrix S(i,j) by d1 rows and d2 columns in the
spatial domain, (d1, d2) ∈ {(0,1), …, (0, 7), (1,0), …, (7,7) }
and generate a shifted spatial image S΄( d1, d2), S΄( d1, d2) =
S(i- d1, j- d2)(i= d1+1, d1+2, …, M; j= d2+1, q+ d2, …, N),
then compress the shifted spatial image S΄( d1, d2) to JPEG
format at the same quantization matrix;
Decode the shifted JPEG image to spatial domain, denoted
by a matrix S΄΄( d1, d2);
Calculate the difference D (d1, d2)= S΄( d1, d2) - S΄΄( d1, d2);
Shift-recompression based ReShuffle Characteristic
features (SRSC) on the region of interest R, SRSCR are
defined by:

(a) An original image

(c) SRSC (original image)

SRSCR (d1 , d 2 ) =

D
S

(d1 , d 2 ) ,
R ( d1 , d 2 )

R

'

(1)

Where (d1, d2 ) ∈ {(0,1),...,(0,7), (1,0),...,(7,7)}.There are a total
of 63 features for each R.
If an image was cropped under the misalignment by p rows and q
columns, mod (p, 8) ≠ 0 or mod (q, 8) ≠0, 0≤p≤8, 0≤q≤8, and then
recompressed at the same quantization matrix to the original
JPEG image, we expect that the SRSC features will be distinct
due to the misalignment, and the values of p and q can be
determined by the SRSC features. Figure 2 shows an original
JPEG image (a) and a cropped image with misalignment p=4 and
q=4 (b). The SRSC features from original image and the
misaligned recompressed image (p=4, q=4), respectively, are
shown in (c), and (d). The circle highlights the major differences
of SRSC features between the original and manipulated image. It
shows that SRSC features may be effective in exposing the
misaligned operations that are encoded with the same
quantization matrix.

(b). a cropped image (p=4, q=4)

(e) SRSC(cropped, p=4, q=4)

Figure 2. A comparison of SRSC features from an original JPEG image and three cropped JPEG images. X-label shows the SRSC
feature index and y-label indicates the value [13].

3.2 Proposed Approach to Detecting AAC
Audio Forgery
As pointed out in [13], JPEG compression generally generates
block artifacts. We surmise that similar to JPEG compression,

AAC audio compression also introduces block (frame) artifacts.
While two AAC audio files are manipulated together, or some
part is removed from an AAC audio file in temporal domain, and
doctored audio data are re-encoded in AAC format at the same bit
rate, the original block artifacts are generally undermined, in

other words, original block switching structure will be reshuffled
with a part of the neighbor blocks. By revealing such reshuffling
manipulation, we may locate the doctored areas in the AAC audio
forgery that was encoded at the same bit rate. According to our
previous work in image forgery detection [13], we propose a
shift-recompression-based differential analysis to detect the
forgery in AAC audio streams with the same compression bit rate,
described as follows.
Shift-Recompression-based Differential Analysis Algorithm
1.

Decode the examined AAC audio stream to temporal
domain, denoted by a matrix S(i,j) (i=0,1, 2, …, M; j
indicates the number of channel of the audio signal);

2.

For AAC stationary audio signal, each frame contains 1024
time-domain samples. Allegedly, each frame stands alone
and does not depend on previous frames (whereas many
perceptual audio codecs such MP3 overlap data with the
previous frame).

3.

For t=1:1023
a)

Shift the matrix S(i,j) by t samples in the temporal
domain (t=1,2,…1023). A shifted temporal WAV signal
S΄(i, j, t) is produced. S΄(i, j, t) = S(i-t, j), i= t, t+1, t+2,
…, M;

b)

Encode the shifted temporal signal S΄( i, j, t) to AAC
format at the same bit rate;

c)

Decode the encoded audio signal from the above step to
temporal domain, denoted by S΄΄( i, j, t);

d)

Calculate the difference D(i, j, t)= S΄( i, j, t) - S΄΄( i, j,
t);

e)

Shift-recompression based reshuffle
features (SRSC) are given by:

D (i , j , t )

( )
SRSC (t ) =
s ' (i, j, t )

( )
i, j

i, j

characteristic

(2)

We obtain 1023 SRSC features for a stationary AAC audio file
since t = 1, 2, ..., 1023.
While AAC audio stream are tampered in temporal domain and
original frame structures are generally broken, by checking the
SRSC feature under each different shift-recompression, we
surmise that untouched SRSC features and tampered SRSC
features are different, especially at the corresponding shift. As a
result, the manipulation may be exposed.

4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Detection of Cropping and Recompression
To verify our proposed shift-recompression-based differential
analysis, we select 1000 never compressed WAV files; each file is
in the length of 20 seconds. These WAV files are compressed in
AAC format by using FAAC encoder, which is based on the
original ISO MPEG reference code [19]. To simulate the shiftrecompression of AAC audio forgery manipulation, AAC audio
files are decoded into temporal domain and cropped by different
samples at the beginning of the audio signals, then re-encoded in
AAC format at the same bit rate. In our study, we tried to produce
the cropping database at each possible cropping, or the number of
samples removed is set from 1 to 1023, however, the timeconsuming is too high to complete. Therefore, in our experiments,
the numbers of the samples cropped are only set as 5, 50, 200,
400, 480, 512, 750, 900, and 1000, respectively. 1023 SRSC
features are extracted from 1000 untouched AAC audio files and
from the nine categories of doctored AAC audio files. Figure 3
shows the SRSC features extracted from an untouched AAC
audio file and from the cropping by 50 samples and the cropping
by 900 samples individually and recompressed versions.
We apply a popular SVM technique LibSVM [17] with a linear
kernel for training and testing. One hundred experiments are
performed for training and testing. In each experiment, 60%
feature sets from each category are randomly selected for training
and the remainders are used for testing. The mean testing of the
confusion matrix over 100 experiments are shown by Table 1.

Figure 3. SRSC features of original AAC audio (a) and the AAC audio once cropped by 50 samples (b) and by 900 samples (c)

Table 1. Confusion matrix on testing sets (mean values, %) by using LibSVM with linear kernel over 100 experiments.
Prediction

Truth

untouched

Manipulation
(Cropped by)

5
50
200
400
480
512
750
900
1000

untouched
99.4
3.4
1.8
2.1
1.5
1.2
2.3
2.0
2.4
2.2

5
0.2
96.6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

50
0.0
0
98.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

4.2 Detection of AAC Forgery
In this type of experiments, we randomly select 200 AAC audio
files, and remove a few audio samples in the middle, with the
block switch offset by 100, 300, 500, 700, and 900 samples, then
encode the doctored audio signals into AAC format at the same
bit rate. There are total of 1000 doctored AAC audio files. We
apply shift-recompression-based differential analysis to each
audio file (including untouched and doctored audio files), each
audio file is equally divided into six segments, as a result, 1200
untouched segments and 3000 touched segments are obtained.
SRSC features are extracted from each segment, in order to
discriminate the doctored audio files from untouched files, and

200
0.0
0
0
97.9
0
0
0
0
0
0

Manipulation (cropped by)
400
480
512
0.0
0.3
0.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
98.6
0
0
98.8
0
0
97.7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

750
0.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
98.1
0
0

900
0.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
97.7
0

1000
0.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
97.9

identify the doctored areas. The experimental design is the same
to the process described in III.A. Table 2 shows the confusion
matrix with the experimental results over 100 experiments.
Figure 4 shows the SRSC features extracted from the six parts of
an original AAC audio file (first row) and from the six part of the
doctored AAC audio file with the forgery taking place on the
middle. The comparison show that the first three parts of the
original audio and doctored audio are similar, but the pattern of
the SRSC features from the last three parts are different, which
approximately reveals the forged area in doctored AAC audio
stream in the middle.

Table 2. Confusion matrix on testing sets (mean values, %) by using LibSVM with linear kernel over 100 experiments.
Prediction
Truth

untouched

forgery (shifted by)
100

300

500

700

900

98.8

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.3

100

1.2

98.7

0

0

0

0.0

forgery

300

0.8

0.1

99.1

0

0

0.0

(shifted
by)

500

0.6

0

0.0

99.4

0.0

0.0

700

0.8

0

0.0

0

99.2

0.0

900

1.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

0

98.6

untouched

Figure 4. The SRSC features extracted from an original AAC audio file and from manipulated AAC audio file (doctoring in the middle).

(a) Original MP3
(b). MP3 cropped by 550 samples and encoded at the same bit rate
Figure 5. SRSC features of original (a) and manipulated MP3 files (b)

4.3 Discussion and Future Study
Although our experiments presented above do not examine all
possibility of AAC audio forgery due to the very high
computational cost (it is very time-consuming to examine of all
possible forgery shifted by 1023 positions), by simulating part
cases of AAC audio forgery at a reasonable computational cost,
our experimental results do verify the effectiveness of our
proposed shift-recompression-based approach to detecting AAC
audio forgery of the same bit rate. The detection accuracy is very
promising.
It is worth noting that shift-recompression-based method is
effective not only for detecting AAC audio forgery, but also for
detecting MP3 audio forgery on the same bit rate. Figure 5 shows
an example of SRSC features extracted from an untouched MP3
audio file and a doctored MP3 file. The difference is that each
MP3 frame contains 576 time-domain samples, therefore, the
feature set only consists of 575 features, not 1023 features.
Our previous studys shows that image complexity and audio
signal complexy [11, 15, 23] may play important role in
evaluating the detection performance. In the future, we will exam
the detection peformance under different audio signal complexity,
and explore new audio forgery detection methods at a lower
computational cost.

5. CONCLUSIONS

There was no literature before targeting on the forgery detection
of AAC audio streams on the same compression bit-rate. In this
paper, we propose a shift-recompression-based differential
analysis to detecting AAC audio forgery with learning classifiers.
Although our method is pretty straightforward, experimental
results show that our approach is quite promising and effective.
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